Introduction
The conventional wisdom before the financial crisis that started in 2007 suggested a link between financial openness and economic growth. Papers by Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005) Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad and Siegel (2007) and Quinn and Toyoda (2008) have shown that financial liberalization promotes economic growth. Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2011) provides additional evidence that financial openness improves the growth of factor productivity. They attribute these liberalization effects to the role of financial openness in stock market and banking sector development, and to changes in the quality of institutions.
In a study that focuses on the growth experience in China, do not find a link between China's economic growth and foreign trade and foreign direct investment. They identify a more efficient financial sector, less state ownership, higher quality of government institutions and full financial openness as important factors that may promote further growth of China's economy.
The experience of the financial crisis suggests that Chinese banks with their mixture of government and private ownership may have significant advantages. At the height of the crisis the three largest banks by market capitalization in the world were all Chinese. The banks did not suffer from financial stability problems and this helped China to come through the crisis well, at least so far. In this paper, we focus on the IPO of the largest bank in China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), to examine how China takes steps in liberalizing their financial sector by taking a state-owned bank public and combining government and private ownership. The IPO of ICBC was the largest bank IPO in history at the time of its IPO. ICBC is also the largest bank by market capitalization in China and globally (see Table 1 ). It provides a good example of how a state-owned bank in an emerging market goes through the privatization process. We provide detailed analyses on how government takes active measures to clean up the troubled assets, improve the bank's capital performance, and effectively prepare a smooth transition from a totally government owned bank to a partially government owned bank. This process has been an initial success for China's government in their efforts to further open up their financial markets, develop their bank sector to meet international standards, and move financial institutions to function in a market-oriented manner.
The paper starts by providing information on China's banking sector (Section 2), information on ICBC (Section 3), its efforts to become a global bank (Section 4), its IPO process and valuation (Section 5), and finishes with a discussion of the IPO and the conclusions that can be drawn (Section 6).
China's Banking Sector 1

Overview
China's banking sector has been through several stages of development and reforms.
Between 1949 and 1979, China's entire financial system consisted of one bank, the PBOC, which was a single bank that managed all deposit-taking, lending and payment system functions of the state planning system. In 1979, as part of the reform towards a more modern banking system, PBOC's international trade financing and foreign exchange businesses were spun off to the Bank of China (BOC), the agriculture and fixed investment & construction functions were allocated to the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and the China Construction Bank (CCB) respectively. In 1984, the PBOC became the central bank after its savings and loan functions were transferred to ICBC.
By the early 1990s, the top-tier structure of the Chinese banking system was formed, with the Big Four banks, 9 joint-stock commercial banks, and numerous cooperatives and finance companies. All of the non-bank financial institutions can be classified into one or more of the following: trust and investment companies (TICs), finance companies, financial leasing companies, rural credit cooperatives and urban credit cooperatives.
China's banking system had been under strict government control including setting interest rates, lending targets and lending decisions until the early 1990s. In 1993 and 1994, with the establishment of the three policy banks (the State Development Bank of China, the Export-Import Bank of China and the Agricultural Development Bank of China), the largest four specialized banks became the Big Four state-owned commercial banks.
The dominance of the Big Four banks also implies that the degree of competition within the banking sector has been low. For example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001) compare the fivebank concentration (share of the assets of the five largest banks in total banking assets), and find that China's concentration ratio of 91% at the end of 1997 (and for much of 1990s) is one of the highest in the world. However, China's concentration ratio has been falling sharply since 1997 with the entrance of many non-state banks and intermediaries. There are more than 30,000 banks and non-bank financial institutions operating as legal entities in China, although the Big Four banks still control more than half of the total banking assets.
The most significant problem for China's banking sector, and for the entire financial system in recent years, has been the amount of NPLs within state-owned banks, and in particular, among the Big Four banks. Reducing the amount of NPLs to normal levels was the most important task for China's financial system in the short term. Since the late 1990s, the central government has been taking actions to improve the banking industry's asset quality, risk management and capital base, to ensure that state-owned banks will eventually be transformed into modern (limited liability) corporations listed in global capital markets and complying with international standards. Thus, it was important to reduce the level of NPLs to improve the banks' capital adequacy.
In 1998, the Ministry of Finance issued RMB270 billion in bonds to enhance the capital adequacy of the Big Four banks. In 1999, four asset management corporations (AMCs: Huarong, Great Wall, Xinda, and Oriental) were established to assume RMB1.4 trillion worth of NPLs from the Big Four. Despite these and other efforts, at the end of 2001 the total amount of NPLs within the Big Four was estimated to be at the level of around RMB1.7 trillion; among the four banks, only the Bank of China, which has the lowest level of exposure to bad loans, could meet the 8% capital adequacy ratio imposed by the Basle Accord.
Recognizing the importance of and its responsibility in reducing NPLs in the Big Four banks, the Chinese government injected foreign currency reserves (mostly in the form of US dollars, T-bills, Euros and Yen) into these banks to improve their balance sheets in preparation for publicly listed and traded in either the HKSE and/or the SHSE. Given that China's total foreign exchange reserve reached US$1.68 trillion as of March 2008, the largest in the world, while the total amount of NPLs was around US$160 billion at the end of 2007, the foreign exchange reserves were more than enough to remove all the existing NPLs off the books of all the banks in China. Table 2 shows the size of the NPLs among China, U.S., Japan, Korean, India, Indonesia and Taiwan between 1997 and 2006.
The Big Four account for about 60% and 50% of the total deposits and total loans, respectively, of banking institutions. Among the Big Four, ICBC is the largest bank by total assets, total deposits, and total loans. In each of the three categories, ICBC captures about 30% of the total market amount.
Banking Industry Trends and Challenges
The banking industry, along with financial markets in China, has been undergoing significant reforms for some time. The government is expected to continue to strengthen regulation and further liberalize the markets (e.g., entry of new financial institutions and setting of interest rates), while commercial banks are expected to enhance corporate governance that is in line with international best practices and improve risk management -with the focus on improving capital adequacy, asset quality, liquidity, operational efficiency and profitability. Banks are also expected to improve credit approval procedures and other lending practices, attract more foreign investment, expand businesses into insurance and asset/fund management, and promote further growth of feeand commission-based products and services.
As mentioned earlier, NPLs within the banking sector were significantly reduced in the years leading up to the IPO following the sequence of restructuring and recapitalization effects, including directly injecting capital into and transferring the NPLs out of the banks' balance sheets.
However, many feared that the injection plan might create perverse incentives for state-owned banks, because these banks will believe that there would be a "bailout" whenever they run into financial problems again, leading to a lack of incentive to improve efficiency. Many argued that in spite of the reduction, NPLs would remain a potential problem as the then current NPL ratio (total non-performing loans/total outstanding loans) was still substantially higher than the 2% ratio of leading banks around the world. Indeed, more than half of the reduction of NPLs from [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] was done through the transfer to state-owned asset management companies. The problem was that only 20% of the face value of these loans was expected to be recovered and the government would still need to provide more capital. Another reason for the reduction in NPL ratio was the increases in loans during these years. Due to the lack of consistent standards and transparency, some conjectured that the size of NPLs might be underestimated.
Bank earnings are significantly exposed to business cycles, since they rely heavily on corporate banking and relatively large property-related loans. The fear was that the strong growth and high liquidity in the financial system would lead to increased property prices. However, if the real estate market was brewing another bubble, the bursting of the bubble could lead to earnings and asset quality deterioration for banks with large exposure to this sector. This problem can be more A further challenge was the lack of transparency in the banking industry. Though risk-based capital rules had been used for many years, it was still unclear as to how these standards were consistently applied to all banking sectors equally and whether they were consistent across the banking system. Chinese listed banks were required to adopt international financial reporting 
Regulations
Chinese banks are jointly regulated by the central bank, the PBOC, and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The publicly listed banks are also subject to the supervision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The Ministry of Finance (MOF) determines tax and local accounting rules for the banks.
Historically the setting of interest rates on loans and deposits was tightly controlled by the government. China liberalized lending rates on the upside. Interest rates on deposits have not been liberalized yet unless the depositor has a dollar deposit account above $3million (RMB deposits have fixed rates regardless of the amount of the deposits).
Since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, one of the top priorities of the CBRC was to monitor the health of the banking system through the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of commercial banks which should be no lower than 8% in line with the Basel I Accord. With the accession to the WTO, the CBRC committed to remove all non-prudential restrictions on foreign banks and provide the environment for the opening up of the Chinese market to foreign banks by the end of 2006.
The CBRC also provided guidelines on the corporate governance reform and supervision of state-owned commercial banks including ICBC. Publicly listed banks, along with other listed companies, follow a mixture of U.S. and European models with both a board of directors and a supervisory board. The government and regulators believe that banks going public can accelerate the transformation of China's banking system -to help create more efficient and effective intermediation of funds in the economy and provide the banks with greater flexibility to raise finance to support the capital needs of the growing economy. On the other hand, government ownership of all major banks still plays an important role. 
Background Information of ICBC
History of ICBC
Business and Operation
ICBC is a commercial bank that provides wholesale banking, personal banking, e-banking, Prior to the IPO, ICBC had been focusing on developing non-interest based businesses and had experienced fast growth in their fee-and commission-based income. Their net fees and commission income were the highest among the Big Four banks, with the average compound annual growth rate in their fee-based banking greater than 30% per annum. ICBC's fee-based banking business mainly covered bank cards, clearing and settlements, investment banking, wealth management, agency services, electronic banking and custody service businesses. A large part of their wealth management fees come from the increased transaction volumes in the distribution of life insurance products and mutual funds. Table 4 summarizes ICBC's loan portfolios and yields.
Making ICBC a Global Standard Bank
Prior to the IPO, ICBC had taken several steps in reforming the bank into a global standard bank. These reforms focused on setting up efficient operation systems that match with the international standard, financial restructuring that try to enhance the capital adequacy and reduce the non-performing loan problem, setting up good corporate governance mechanisms, and an up-todate risk management system.
Operational Reforms
Prior to the IPO, ICBC began a new phase of operational reforms in 2006, focusing on improving customer services, risk management, and operational efficiency. More specifically, they focused on realigning customer oriented business activities including corporate banking, personal banking, treasury operations, streamlining operational structure by reducing branches and management layers, enhancing risk management and internal control systems, centralizing capital and financial management with a better reporting platform and a comprehensive review system, and improving employee incentive structures such as establishing an EVA-based profit sharing program.
Financial Restructuring
ICBC went through a series of financial restructuring efforts to enhance its capital adequacy, and the key dates and events are summarized in 
Board of directors
ICBC established their board size to be between five and seventeen members. They also stipulated that executive directors (inside directors) shall not exceed one-third of the total number of directors. At least three directors had to meet the requirements of independent directors according to China's law and regulation about directors' independence.
Right before the IPO, there were fourteen members on the Board of Directors. These consisted of four executive directors (about 28.6%), seven non-executive directors, and three independent directors. Among the seven non-executive directors, six were government officials prior to joining ICBC's board, and the other one (Christopher A. Cole) was from Goldman Sachs, one of the strategic investors. Two independent directors were academic professors from Tsinghua University. One independent director was a former investment banker from Hong Kong. Most of the non-executive directors and independent directors joined the ICBC board within a year prior to ICBC's IPO. There was no minority shareholder serving on the Board of Directors.
The board had four committees: strategy, audit, risk management, and nomination and compensation committees. Under the risk management committee, they also established a related party transaction committee.
In China, besides the board of directors, there is also a supervisory board. This is similar to the typical two-tier board in parts of Europe. ICBC's supervisory board has five supervisors, two external ones and three internal ones. Two internal supervisors are appointed by the State Council, two external supervisors have prior government work experience, and one supervisor representing employees is the general manager of the Legal Affairs Department.
ICBC's establishment of the board of directors is in accordance with the Provisional
Guidelines on Due Diligence of the Board of Directors of Joint Stock Commercial Banks. Table 5 shows the governance structure of ICBC.
Compensation
ICBC adopts the market-oriented incentive system that organizes their management based job functions and value added. ICBC implements an economic value-added (EVA)-based incentive scheme, such that employee income is tied to the employee's personal performance and the contribution made by their respective work units. This incentive scheme is intended to attract, retain, motivate and develop a high quality workforce.
ICBC compensates their directors, supervisors and senior management with salaries, bonuses, enterprise annuities, social security plans, housing provident fund plans. In preparation for the IPO, ICBC also adopted a share appreciation rights policy. This essentially is the same as stock option grants in U.S. companies. Directors, supervisors, senior management and other board designated personnel are eligible for participation in the share appreciation rights plan. The benchmark price is based on the market value of the stocks that are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Risk Management
Risk management is very important to the banking sector. ICBC implemented a risk management framework covering credit, liquidity, market and operational risks. This framework, which is supported by ICBC's advanced risk management information technology, enabled ICBC to better manage the risks and thus to improve asset quality.
Prior to 1994, ICBC was a state-owned specialized bank and their risk management further improving risk warning and early identification and prevention capabilities: and enhancing asset and liability management capabilities and further centralize risk management. Table 6 describes the risk management structure of ICBC. The allocation of H shares pursuant to the International Offering was determined by the Joint Bookrunners and was based on a number of factors including the level and the timing of the demand, the total size of the relevant investor's invested assets or equity assets in the relevant sector and whether or not it was expected that the relevant investor is likely to buy further, and/or hold or sell H shares after the listing on HKSE. The targets were professional, institutional, corporate, and retail investors. The goal was to establish a stable shareholder base. ICBC was expected to use the net proceeds from the Global Offering to strengthen its capital base to support the ongoing growth of its business.
The IPO of ICBC
The IPO Process
Valuation of ICBC Stock in Preparation for the IPO
According to most analysts (in Hong Kong), ICBC enjoyed some cost advantages over its peers, however, its profitability was on the lower end relative to peers. Many analysts believed ICBC's efforts in streamlining its vast distribution network (over 18,000 branches) and its plan to adopt an economic value added incentive scheme would boost employee productivity and improve operational efficiency. ICBC's asset quality lagged that of its peers, mainly due to its longer operating histories and more exposure to state-owned enterprise (SOE) lending; on the other hand, ICBC's low NPL ratio of just 1.86% for new loans made since FY99 offered good proof of its enhanced risk control. Analysts believed that its assets quality would continue to improve in the foreseeable future. Most of the Chinese banks' performance moved closely together, reflecting their close relation with the overall economic growth and the underlying macroeconomic conditions.
Many analysts believed ICBC's growth was more steady and defendable compared to its peers because of its leadership position in terms of market shares.
A standard approach to evaluate a financial services company such as a commercial bank is the equity cash flow (ECF) method rather than the enterprise DCF approach for a non-financial services firm. For most nonfinancial companies, operating decisions and financing decisions are separate. For financial companies, however, we cannot value operations separately from interest income and expense, since these are important components of their income. Moreover, financing decisions, for example, the choice of leverage, are at the core of how banks and insurers generate earnings. Therefore, to value financial institutions we should use the ECF method to directly estimate (free) cash flows for the equity holders. 3 We can derive ECF from net income minus the earnings retained in the business:
Equity Cash Flow = Net Income -Increase in Equity + Other Comprehensive Income
We start with net income because it represents the earnings theoretically available to shareholders after the company has paid all expenses, including those to debtholders. However, net income is not a cash flow. As a financial institution grows, it will need to increase equity to prevent the debt/equity ratio from rising above solvency levels imposed by regulators. Hence, increases in equity reduce ECF, because the company must set aside earnings that could otherwise be paid out to shareholders. Finally, we add back other comprehensive income (if applicable), which under US GAAP consists of several noncash items that are added or subtracted from the equity account. can be calculated by considering overall changes in balance sheet or by determining the implied shareholders' equity. We can first forecast the growth in loans and deposits, and for simplicity, assuming a fixed ratio of total loans to total deposits going forward.
We then derive risk-adjusted assets from total loans with another simplifying assumption of fixed ratio of risk-adjusted assets to total loans. We also calculate Tier 1 capital from risk-adjusted assets, assuming, again, a fixed percentage of Tier 1 capital to risk-adjusted assets. Alternatively, as the business grows, we can assume that this ratio falls to the regulatory minimum (8%) in the long run. Exhibit 12 presents information on key financial indicators of ICBC and other comparable banks. We then calculate total shareholders' equity to be equal to Tier 1 capital plus goodwill.
Finally, the terminal value can be estimated by:
TV = NI * (1-g / RONE)
(r E -g) where -NI: net income in the first year after forecast period ends; -g: NI perpetual growth rate; -RONE: incremental return on new equity after forecasting period;
-r E : cost of equity.
Some comments on the ECF approach are as follows:  Development stages: the explicit forecast is divided into three 5-year stages of development that correspond to the take-off stage, high-growth stage, and maturing stage. A low growth rate of 3.5% was assumed in calculating terminal value.
 Forecast growth ratios: largely based on analysts' consensus; some were based on averages of ICBC historical data.
 Assets & liabilities: deposits are the main driver to growth, and loans and other assets are forecast in proportion to deposits. Assumed asset compositions and loan quality remain stable (i.e., provisions to loans ratio remains unchanged).
 Equity & risk-adjusted capital: Banks need to increase equity as they grow in order to fulfill the capital requirements set forth by regulators; while risk-adjusted capital may not necessarily be the same as book-value of equity, the model assumes book-value of equity is a good proxy of risk-adjusted capital the bank needs to employ.  Cost of equity: calculated using CAPM and emerging market equity premium of 6%, riskfree rate of 5%, and equity beta of 1.1.  Sensitivity analysis: needs to be performed on the key inputs, such as terminal growth rate, cost of equity and long-term risk free rate.
Finally, to evaluate the per share value of ICBC stock (for IPO), we assume the total number of shares outstanding to be 334,019 million. According to the investment bankers and ICBC (and verified in the IPO prospectus), after distribution to all major institutional shareholders, most of the remaining shares would be listed on the HKSE and the rest on the SHSE. In terms of IPO pricing of A shares (in SHSE) and H shares (in HKSE), the prices were to reflect the same fundamental value of the equity (i.e., the per share value of the ECF approach) and spot exchange rate between RMB and HK$ (as of 10/26/06). billion. China's largest commercial bank was also the first company to be listed simultaneously on both the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock exchanges.
ICBC raised at least US$14 billion in Hong Kong (H-shares) and another US$5.1 billion in Shanghai (A-shares). Due to heavy subscriptions, the greenshoe (i.e. over-allotment) placements were exercised and ICBC's take rose to US$21.9 billion (17% of ICBC's market value before the IPO). At the end of its first day of trading, the bank's shares closed up almost 15% at HK$3.52 in Hong Kong, compared with the listing price of HK$3.07, which was set at the top of the indicative range due to the strong demand. Meanwhile, ICBC's Shanghai-listed A-shares recorded more modest gains and ended up 5.1% from the offering price of RMB 3.12.
Post-IPO performance
If ICBC's IPO is seen as part of the initial success of the Chinese government opening up their banking sector, then it is important to know whether this step of liberalizing the banking sector brings further development and better performance of the involved banks. During the first year after the IPO, ICBC experienced further improvement in its profitability and its net profit increased about 60%, higher than the average growth rate in profitability of 30% prior to its IPO. Table 7 ICBC continues its efforts in improving its governance structure. The year following its IPO, a new independent director was elected to the board. With Central Huijin and China's Ministry of Finance each holding more than 30% of ownership, the issue of governance is not simply shareholder value maximization or managing the conflicts between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. It is more complex and has to do with different types of agency problems. Table 8 shows the distribution of the shareholdings by majority shareholders. Government ownership is dominant. However, with the presence of the foreign strategic shareholders at ICBC, we may expect some further improvement in its effectiveness of the governance mechanisms. With the observed growth in its business and profitability, it suggests that ICBC's board of directors are doing a good job in creating value for the bank. Table 9 shows the structure of ICBC's board of directors. ICBC's board structure has been quite stable after its IPO. We observe an increase in the percentage of the independent directors (above 30%) up until 2010. Insiders and government officials are still the majority on the board.
Recent data shows that ICBC's non-performing loan ratio has been around 2%. This suggests that ICBC has maintained or even further reduced their non-performing loan after the IPO.
We do note that ICBC's H-shares have been over-performing the market, while their A-shares have been underperforming the market.
Discussion and Conclusions
The IPO of ICBC marks one of the initial efforts taken by Chinese government to liberalize their financial sector. With more and more banks going public, the banking sector invited many foreign investors. Some of the foreign investors like Goldman Sachs and Allianz were strategic investors, which not only provided capital to the bank, but also formed a strategic alliance with the bank. However, the process of banking sector privatization is still just beginning. Even though ICBC has listed stock on two stock exchanges, the majority of the ownership is still with the Chinese government. The role of government ownership stakes may lead to certain conflicts of interest. On the one hand, the bank may be able to seek rents from the government given the extensive government ownership. Regulations may be more likely to favour banks like ICBC.
However, on the other hand, the government ownership stake may lead to the government seeking rents from the bank -the conflicts of "for-profit" goals of the bank versus "not-for-profit" goals of the government. This conflict of interest may be intensified because of the political connections of the directors and supervisors on the board. The government may make the bank provide capital to government owned projects, which may lead to lower capital proficiency for the bank. This could lead to a typical agency problem -the majority shareholders expropriating the minority shareholders.
ICBC appears to have adopted a standard board of directors with a sufficient number of outside directors. However, the majority of the directors are still either current government officials or previous bureaucrats. The question is that how independent they are in making decisions or evaluating the management.
With the WTO agreements, China has taken steps in liberalizing its financial markets and banking sector. The role of government ownership should become less and less important for banks like ICBC. As more foreign strategic investors move into the domestic market, financial institutions like ICBC will face more competition. It is important for domestic financial institutions to stay competitive.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the conventional view is that a more efficient financial sector, less state ownership, higher quality of government institutions and full financial openness (identified in ) are critical for China's further economic growth. However, in the crisis this conventional wisdom did not hold up well. In fact China's banks did much better than western banks. The IPO of ICBC may help the firm stay competitive, as outside minority shareholders or those strategic investors will discount the bank if the management or majority shareholders are not maximizing firm value. It will be interesting to see if government ownership in the banking sector recedes overtime, and whether this will essentially improve the bank's competitive position in the market place. What will happen when more and foreign banks are allowed banking business in China? Will long-term government protection create inertia and prevent real efficiency inside the financial institution? Or will the Chinese model with partial ownership prove to be better in the face of financial crises? These are all interesting questions we hope to answer in the future. 
